Truthful online auctions for pricing peer-to-peer services

Po-An Chen*, Tyng Ruey Chuang

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Conference contribution同行評審

摘要

We consider truthful online auctions that aim at optimizing sellers' revenues, representing service contributors' satisfactions, as a general model for pricing peer-to-peer services under the assumption of individual service consumer's rationality. For services that are in unlimited supply, we design a randomized truthful online auction with guaranteed revenue based on a randomized truthful offline auction. It is shown that the expected revenue extracted by our truthful online auction over all random factors achieves a Θ(1) approximation ratio relative to the optimal single-price revenue under some reasonable assumption about the input bids. Since a peer must serve others to earn sufficient revenue that can cover its payment for being served, we argue that our online truthful auctions can be suitable schemes for incentivizing peer nodes in peer-to-peer systems to share, and thereby addressing the "free-rider" problem in peer-to-peer service sharing.

原文English
主出版物標題Proceedings - Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology, CEC 2005
頁面59-66
頁數8
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2005
事件7th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology, CEC 2005 - Munich, 德國
持續時間: 19 7月 200522 7月 2005

出版系列

名字Proceedings - Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology, CEC 2005
2005

Conference

Conference7th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology, CEC 2005
國家/地區德國
城市Munich
期間19/07/0522/07/05

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