Competitive dynamics research explains why and how rivals attack each other, but it only implicitly captures how buyer engagement influences attacker-target relations. This potential oversimplification of the buyer’s influence is further exacerbated by another problem: An overwhelming majority of targets do not react to attacks against them (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). Introducing a demand-side approach to competitive dynamics, this conceptual study evinces that buyer engagement subsequent to an attack and the nonresponse decision of targets are quite interrelated; when attacks resonate with and harness strong buyer engagement, targets retaliate; when attacks leave buyers unaffected, targets remain unmoved. Our analytical simulations indicate that buyer engagement plays a consequential role in attacker-target relations, resulting in conditions for nonresponse that may be asymmetrical to those motivating response.
|出版狀態||Published - 2019|
|事件||Strategic Management Society 39th Annual Conference - Minneapolis, Minneapolis, United States|
持續時間: 19 10月 2019 → 22 10月 2019
|Conference||Strategic Management Society 39th Annual Conference|
|期間||19/10/19 → 22/10/19|