Wave dynamic differential logic combined with differential routing is a working, practical technique to thwart side-channel power attacks. Measurement-based experimental results show that a differential power analysis attack on a prototype IC, fabricated in 0.18μm CMOS, does not disclose the entire secret key of the AES algorithm at 1,500,000 measurement acquisitions. This makes the attack de facto infeasible. The required number of measurements is larger than the lifetime of the secret key in most practical systems.
|頁（從 - 到）||354-365|
|期刊||Lecture Notes in Computer Science|
|出版狀態||Published - 4 十一月 2005|
|事件||7th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2005 - Edinburgh, United Kingdom|
持續時間: 29 八月 2005 → 1 九月 2005