Political connections, financial constraints, and corporate investment

Chung Hua Shen, Chih-Yung Lin*

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

32 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This study investigates whether firms politically connected to the ruling party can mitigate financial constraints and increase their investments. Data on Taiwan-listed companies from 1991 to 2010 are used to answer the preceding issue. Results indicate that firms connected to the ruling party that transitioned into power can mitigate financial constraints, but results do not hold for firms connected to the opposition party that transitioned out of power. Firms connected to both parties have similar results with those connected to the ruling party, but the diminishing effect is weaker than those connected to the ruling party. Results further indicate that financially constrained firms can increase their investment when they have political connections to the ruling party. Finally, firms with strong connections can reduce financial constraints more effectively.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)343-368
頁數26
期刊Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
47
發行號2
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1 8月 2016

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