Physical signal-driven fusion for V2X misbehavior detection

Van Linh Nguyen, Po Ching Lin, Ren Hung Hwang

研究成果: Conference contribution同行評審

3 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)


While source authenticity and message integrity in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications can be well protected via cryptographic schemes, the validity of shared data raises tremendous concerns. An insider attacker can use a legitimate identity to pass the message authentication and disseminate false reports of information such as its location to the surrounding receivers. Without a reliable filter, the control of a host vehicle can be easily trapped to unexpected situations such as wrong acceleration, and that may lead to a crash, loss of life and assets. This work presents a novel misbehavior detection mechanism that can detect such insider attacks. Unlike prior work, our framework works based on the cooperative efforts of (1) the physical signal-based target tracking engine on the host vehicle and (2) the extensive RSSI-based verification of the presence of the target vehicles with spatial and temporal resolution from reliable entities such as road-side units (RSUs). The target is to verify the senders' presence at their claimed locations, validate the consistency of the trajectory movement, and further re-evaluate the reliability of their V2X messages, even without the applicability of radar and LIDAR (e.g., in a non-LOS area). We also demonstrate the example of using this work in various attack scenarios.

主出版物標題2019 IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference, VNC 2019
編輯Danijela Cabric, Onur Altintas, Tim Leinmueller, Hongwei Zhang, Takamasa Higuchi
發行者IEEE Computer Society
出版狀態Published - 12月 2019
事件2019 IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference, VNC 2019 - Los Angeles, United States
持續時間: 4 12月 20196 12月 2019


名字IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference, VNC


Conference2019 IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference, VNC 2019
國家/地區United States
城市Los Angeles


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