Philosophical conceptual analysis as an experimental method

Michael T. Stuart*

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Chapter同行評審

5 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

Philosophical conceptual analysis is an experimental method. Focusing on this helps to justify it from the skepticism of experimental philosophers who follow Weinberg, Nichols & Stich (2001). To explore the experimental aspect of philosophical conceptual analysis, I consider a simpler instance of the same activity: everyday linguistic interpretation. I argue that this, too, is experimental in nature. And in both conceptual analysis and linguistic interpretation, the intuitions considered problematic by experimental philosophers are necessary but epistemically irrelevant. They are like variables introduced into mathematical proofs which drop out before the solution. Or better, they are like the hypotheses that drive science, which do not themselves need to be true. In other words, it does not matter whether or not intuitions are accurate as descriptions of the natural kinds that undergird philosophical concepts; the aims of conceptual analysis can still be met.

原文English
主出版物標題Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation
發行者de Gruyter
頁面267-292
頁數26
ISBN(電子)9783110720129
ISBN(列印)9783943460872
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 19 6月 2015

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