On the design of bail-in-able bonds from the perspective of non-financial firms

Liang Chih Liu*, Tian Shyr Dai, Lei Zhou

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

摘要

To prevent black swan events such as the financial tsunami or COVID-19 from crashing overall economic systems, governments provide bailouts to too-big-to-fail financial institutions and non-financial firms such as airline companies with tax payers’ money. To avoid unfair bailouts, using bail-in-able bonds to absorb an issuing bank's losses and to fulfill capital requirements such as BASEL III has been widely studied. Without capital adequacy requirements, non-financial firms also issue bail-in-able bonds because the embedded loss-absorbing mechanism can cut debt repayments down to reduce bankruptcy risk and thus increase the overall benefits of these firms’ claim holders. However, bond investors require higher rewards to compensate for their potential losses once this mechanism is triggered. In addition, unlike financial institutions, which are strictly regulated, such a mechanism may induce non-financial issuers to take on excessive risk to benefit themselves at the expense of their debt holders. To investigate how the issuances of various (non)-bail-in-able bonds influence the equity and the existing debt holders’ benefits from a non-financial issuer's prospective, we develop novel quadrature pricing formulas based on the structural credit risk model. We find that while non-bail-in-able bonds can be wise choices for low-leverage issuers, bail-in-able bonds with benefit-sharing mechanisms allowing investors to share issuers’ upside profits can efficiently suppress interest expenses and circumvent the asset substitution problem for high-leverage issuers. If the value of an issuer (such as an oil shale firm) mainly depends on the value of that asset (such as oil), issuing a bail-in-able bond referring to the asset could be a wise choice. Otherwise, issuing a bond referring to the issuer's stock price could provide timely fund injections and low interest expenses for a high-leverage public firm.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)1136-1155
頁數20
期刊International Review of Economics and Finance
89
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1月 2024

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