TY - JOUR
T1 - On the design of bail-in-able bonds from the perspective of non-financial firms
AU - Liu, Liang Chih
AU - Dai, Tian Shyr
AU - Zhou, Lei
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2024/1
Y1 - 2024/1
N2 - To prevent black swan events such as the financial tsunami or COVID-19 from crashing overall economic systems, governments provide bailouts to too-big-to-fail financial institutions and non-financial firms such as airline companies with tax payers’ money. To avoid unfair bailouts, using bail-in-able bonds to absorb an issuing bank's losses and to fulfill capital requirements such as BASEL III has been widely studied. Without capital adequacy requirements, non-financial firms also issue bail-in-able bonds because the embedded loss-absorbing mechanism can cut debt repayments down to reduce bankruptcy risk and thus increase the overall benefits of these firms’ claim holders. However, bond investors require higher rewards to compensate for their potential losses once this mechanism is triggered. In addition, unlike financial institutions, which are strictly regulated, such a mechanism may induce non-financial issuers to take on excessive risk to benefit themselves at the expense of their debt holders. To investigate how the issuances of various (non)-bail-in-able bonds influence the equity and the existing debt holders’ benefits from a non-financial issuer's prospective, we develop novel quadrature pricing formulas based on the structural credit risk model. We find that while non-bail-in-able bonds can be wise choices for low-leverage issuers, bail-in-able bonds with benefit-sharing mechanisms allowing investors to share issuers’ upside profits can efficiently suppress interest expenses and circumvent the asset substitution problem for high-leverage issuers. If the value of an issuer (such as an oil shale firm) mainly depends on the value of that asset (such as oil), issuing a bail-in-able bond referring to the asset could be a wise choice. Otherwise, issuing a bond referring to the issuer's stock price could provide timely fund injections and low interest expenses for a high-leverage public firm.
AB - To prevent black swan events such as the financial tsunami or COVID-19 from crashing overall economic systems, governments provide bailouts to too-big-to-fail financial institutions and non-financial firms such as airline companies with tax payers’ money. To avoid unfair bailouts, using bail-in-able bonds to absorb an issuing bank's losses and to fulfill capital requirements such as BASEL III has been widely studied. Without capital adequacy requirements, non-financial firms also issue bail-in-able bonds because the embedded loss-absorbing mechanism can cut debt repayments down to reduce bankruptcy risk and thus increase the overall benefits of these firms’ claim holders. However, bond investors require higher rewards to compensate for their potential losses once this mechanism is triggered. In addition, unlike financial institutions, which are strictly regulated, such a mechanism may induce non-financial issuers to take on excessive risk to benefit themselves at the expense of their debt holders. To investigate how the issuances of various (non)-bail-in-able bonds influence the equity and the existing debt holders’ benefits from a non-financial issuer's prospective, we develop novel quadrature pricing formulas based on the structural credit risk model. We find that while non-bail-in-able bonds can be wise choices for low-leverage issuers, bail-in-able bonds with benefit-sharing mechanisms allowing investors to share issuers’ upside profits can efficiently suppress interest expenses and circumvent the asset substitution problem for high-leverage issuers. If the value of an issuer (such as an oil shale firm) mainly depends on the value of that asset (such as oil), issuing a bail-in-able bond referring to the asset could be a wise choice. Otherwise, issuing a bond referring to the issuer's stock price could provide timely fund injections and low interest expenses for a high-leverage public firm.
KW - Asset substitution problem
KW - Bail-in-able bond
KW - Contingent capital
KW - Structural credit risk model
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85169834795&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.098
DO - 10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.098
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85169834795
SN - 1059-0560
VL - 89
SP - 1136
EP - 1155
JO - International Review of Economics and Finance
JF - International Review of Economics and Finance
ER -