Norton and the Logic of Thought Experiments

Michael T. Stuart*

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

12 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

John D. Norton defends an empiricist epistemology of thought experiments, the central thesis of which is that thought experiments are nothing more than arguments. Philosophers have attempted to provide counterexamples to this claim, but they haven’t convinced Norton. I will point out a more fundamental reason for reformulation that criticizes Norton’s claim that a thought experiment is a good one when its underlying logical form possesses certain desirable properties. I argue that by Norton’s empiricist standards, no thought experiment is ever justified in any deep sense due to the properties of its logical form. Instead, empiricists should consider again the merits of evaluating thought experiments more like laboratory experiments, and less like arguments.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)451-466
頁數16
期刊Axiomathes
26
發行號4
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1 12月 2016

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