Multi-path vs. single-path replies to skepticism

Wen fang Wang*

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Conference contribution同行評審

摘要

In order to reply to the contemporary skeptic’s argument for the conclusion that we don’t have any empirical knowledge about the external world, several authors have suggested different fallibilist theories of knowledge that reject the epistemic closure principle. Holliday [8], however, shows that almost all of them suffer from either the problem of containment or the problem of vacuous knowledge. Furthermore, Holliday [9] suggests that the fallibilist should allow a proposition to have multiple sets of relevant alternatives, each of which is sufficient while none is necessary, if all its members are eliminated, for knowing that proposition. Not completely satisfied with Holliday’s multi-path reply to the skeptic, the author suggests a new single-path relevant alternative theory of knowledge and argues that it can avoid both the problem of containment and the problem of vacuous knowledge while rejecting skepticism.

原文English
主出版物標題Business Process Management - 15th International Conference, BPM 2017, Proceedings
編輯Jeremy Seligman, Tomoyuki Yamada, Alexandru Baltag
發行者Springer Verlag
頁面65-78
頁數14
ISBN(列印)9783319649993
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2017
事件15th International Conference on Business Process Management, BPM 2017 - Barcelona, Spain
持續時間: 10 9月 201715 9月 2017

出版系列

名字Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
10445 LNCS
ISSN(列印)0302-9743
ISSN(電子)1611-3349

Conference

Conference15th International Conference on Business Process Management, BPM 2017
國家/地區Spain
城市Barcelona
期間10/09/1715/09/17

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