Managerial ability and financial statement disaggregation decisions

Dien Giau Bui, Yehning Chen, Yan Shing Chen, Chih Yung Lin*

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

1 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

Firms with high-ability management teams disclose more disaggregated information in financial statements than other firms after accounting for endogeneity concerns. Investors deem the disaggregated information disclosed by high-ability managers to be more credible. More disaggregated accounting information reduces stock price crash risk and lowers the cost of equity to a greater extent when provided by high-ability managers. Superior managers’ performance pay is positively related to the level of financial statement disaggregation. These results show that high-ability managers and their firms benefit more from providing granular accounting information.

原文English
文章編號101427
期刊Journal of Empirical Finance
74
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 12月 2023

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