Incentives for physician teams: Effectiveness of performance feedback and payment distribution methods

Li Lin Liang*, A. Dale Tussing, Nicole Huang, Shu Ling Tsai

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

摘要

Best practices in team-based incentive design remain underexplored. This study examines under group-based pay-for-performance, how managers incentivize physicians for teamwork through internal feedback and payment distribution methods. In collaboration with Taiwan Association of Family Medicine, authors conducted a national survey of physician groups, with a response rate of 48.3%. Multilevel linear regression was applied to 134 groups, collectively consisting of 1,245 physicians in Taiwan. The outcome variables were two manager-rated scores for group performance on achieving (a) comprehensive, coordinated, continuous care, and (b) patient health improvement. The results indicate that providing each physician feedback on peer performance is superior to not providing it; when providing peer information within a group, concealing identities is superior to revealing them. These findings imply that application of the principle of social comparison can be effective; however, caution should be taken when disclosure of identifiable peer performance may intensify peer competition and undermine care coordination in team-based models. Further, groups that distribute payments equally among physicians perform better than groups that distributed payment proportionally to physicians’ patient shares. The findings are germane to small teams, where physicians do not have full control over care processes and outcomes, and need to work cooperatively to maximize group-based payment.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)1377-1384
頁數8
期刊Health Policy
125
發行號10
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 10月 2021

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