In Defense of Best-Explanation Debunking Arguments in Moral Philosophy

Jonathon Hricko*, Derek Leben

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

1 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

We aim to develop a form of debunking argument according to which an agent’s belief is undermined if the reasons she gives in support of her belief are best explained as rationalizations. This approach is a more sophisticated form of what Shaun Nichols has called best-explanation debunking, which he contrasts with process debunking, i.e., debunking by means of showing that a belief has been generated by an epistemically defective process. In order to develop our approach, we identify an example of such a best-explanation debunking argument in Joshua Greene’s attack on deontology. After showing that this argument is not an instance of process debunking, we offer our best-explanation approach as a generalization of Greene’s argument. Finally, we defend our approach by showing that it is not susceptible to some criticisms that Nichols has leveled against a less sophisticated form of best-explanation debunking.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)143-160
頁數18
期刊Review of Philosophy and Psychology
9
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1 3月 2018

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