Founding Family Firms and Bank Loan Contracts

Ju Fang Yen, Chih-Yung Lin*, Yan Shing Chen, Ying Chen Huang

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

27 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

Given the economic importance of bank loan financing worldwide, we empirically investigate the role of founding family ownership in bank loan contracts after controlling other governance practices via individual bank loan contracts in Taiwan. We first find that founding family firms can enjoy favorable loan contracts in terms of loan spread. Second, we find that these favors tend to decrease or even disappear when founding families are more likely to expropriate other investors or when the information asymmetry between the borrower and the bank is not severe. Third, we document that the favorable spread effect of founding family firms enlarge for firms with greater credit risk, or during periods of financial crisis.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)53-82
頁數30
期刊Journal of Financial Services Research
48
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2 8月 2015

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