Director networks, accounting conservatism and director reputation: Evidence after financial reporting failure

Chih-Liang Liu, Shu-Miao Lai, In-Mu Haw*

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

1 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This study examines whether connected boards of directors restore their reputation via conservative accounting after financial misstatements. Using a sample of restating firms from 2004 to 2020, we find central boards of directors are positively related to accounting conservatism in the post-restatement period. More importantly, we find accounting conservatism has positive effects on the reputation restoration of directors in central boards, leading to more prestigious board seats, additional outside directorships, and higher compensation following restatements. The reputation recovery of directors in central boards is more prominent among restating firms that seek external financing where potential benefits of director reputation are greater. The findings suggest that directors in central boards successfully recover their damaged reputation via conservative accounting after restatements and minimize adverse consequences in the director market. Our robustness tests support the causal interpretation of our evidence. Collectively, our study offers novel insights into the monitoring incentives resulted from the reputation restoration of directors in central boards via conservative accounting after financial reporting failures.
原文American English
文章編號101421
頁數27
期刊British Accounting Review
早期上線日期8 6月 2024
DOIs
出版狀態E-pub ahead of print - 8 6月 2024

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