TY - JOUR
T1 - Coupons and price discrimination in vertically-correlated markets
AU - Hu, Jin-Li
AU - Chiou, Yu Hsiu
AU - Hwang, Hong
PY - 2004/1/1
Y1 - 2004/1/1
N2 - This research analyzes the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies with respect to manufacturer and retailer coupons. In a model with one manufacturer selling its product to one retailer, it is found that the retailer can achieve third-degree price discrimination equilibrium in retail markets by issuing coupons to demanders with higher elasticity. Although facing only one retailer, the manufacturer can also achieve the same third-degree price discrimination equilibrium by issuing coupons directly to demanders of higher elasticity. However, when only one firm issues the coupon, both manufacturer and retailer coupons can help alleviate the channel profit loss due to double marginalization. If the manufacturer and the retailer non-cooperatively issue coupons, then the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to those under the successive third-degree price discrimination. Moreover, cooperative strategies between the manufacturer and the retailer can eliminate double marginalization, achieve the vertical integration effect, and lead to higher profits, consumer surpluses, and social surpluses than non-cooperative coupon strategies.
AB - This research analyzes the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies with respect to manufacturer and retailer coupons. In a model with one manufacturer selling its product to one retailer, it is found that the retailer can achieve third-degree price discrimination equilibrium in retail markets by issuing coupons to demanders with higher elasticity. Although facing only one retailer, the manufacturer can also achieve the same third-degree price discrimination equilibrium by issuing coupons directly to demanders of higher elasticity. However, when only one firm issues the coupon, both manufacturer and retailer coupons can help alleviate the channel profit loss due to double marginalization. If the manufacturer and the retailer non-cooperatively issue coupons, then the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to those under the successive third-degree price discrimination. Moreover, cooperative strategies between the manufacturer and the retailer can eliminate double marginalization, achieve the vertical integration effect, and lead to higher profits, consumer surpluses, and social surpluses than non-cooperative coupon strategies.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=13244295522&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/mde.1132
DO - 10.1002/mde.1132
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:13244295522
SN - 0143-6570
VL - 25
SP - 29
EP - 40
JO - Managerial and Decision Economics
JF - Managerial and Decision Economics
IS - 1
ER -