Cognitive science and thought experiments: A refutation of Paul Thagard's skepticism

研究成果: Article同行評審

8 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

Paul Thagard has recently argued that thought experiments are dangerous and misleading when we try to use them as evidence for claims. This paper refutes his skepticism. Building on Thagard's own work in cognitive science, I suggest that Thagard has much that is positive to say about how thought experiments work. My last section presents some new directions for research on the intersection between thought experiments and cognitive science.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)264-287
頁數24
期刊Perspectives on Science
22
發行號2
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2014

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