CEO overconfidence and financial crisis: Evidence from bank lending and leverage

Po Hsin Ho, Chia Wei Huang, Chih-Yung Lin*, Ju Fang Yen

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

165 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

Over a period that includes the 1998 Russian crisis and 2007-2009 financial crisis,. banks with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) were more likely to weaken lending standards and increase leverage than other banks. in advance of a crisis,. making them more vulnerable to the shock of the crisis.During crisis years, they generally experienced more increases in loan defaults, greater drops in operating and stock return performance, greater increases in expected default probability, and higher likelihood of CEO turnover or failure than other banks.CEO overconfidence thus can. explain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior among banks.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)194-209
頁數16
期刊Journal of Financial Economics
120
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1 4月 2016

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