"Buy Domestic" Campaigns and Optimal Tariffs

Jiunn Rong Chiou*, Jin-Li Hu, Yan Shu Lin

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

4 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This paper attempts to analyze the strategic use of optimal tariffs and to examine the effects of national bias on the optimal trade policy and social welfare in a two-country, two-good, price competition model derived from Neven et al. (1991). The major findings are as follows. (1) If all consumers prefer the domestic good, then "buy domestic" campaigns will decrease the prohibitive tariff rate and increase local welfare. (2) If at least some consumers prefer the foreign good, but not to a great extent, then "buy domestic" campaigns will not change the optimal tariff rate, but may improve local welfare. (3) When all consumers greatly prefer the foreign good, then promotion of "buy domestic" decreases the optimal tariff rate, but it cannot improve social welfare. With this framework, we also prove that "buy domestic" campaigns serve as a substitute for tariffs with respect to a strategic trade policy.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)143-160
頁數18
期刊Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
80
發行號2
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 20 10月 2003

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