TY - GEN

T1 - Bayesian auctions with friends and foes

AU - Chen, Po-An

AU - Kempe, David

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding strategies. A simple and natural model for bidders' utilities in these settings posits that the utility of a losing bidder i as a result of bidder j winning is a constant (positive or negative) fraction of bidder j's utility. We study such auctions under a Bayesian model in which all valuations are distributed independently according to a known distribution, but the actual valuations are private. We describe and analyze Nash Equilibrium bidding strategies in two broad classes: regular friendship networks with arbitrary valuation distributions, and arbitrary friendship networks with identical uniform valuation distributions.

AB - We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding strategies. A simple and natural model for bidders' utilities in these settings posits that the utility of a losing bidder i as a result of bidder j winning is a constant (positive or negative) fraction of bidder j's utility. We study such auctions under a Bayesian model in which all valuations are distributed independently according to a known distribution, but the actual valuations are private. We describe and analyze Nash Equilibrium bidding strategies in two broad classes: regular friendship networks with arbitrary valuation distributions, and arbitrary friendship networks with identical uniform valuation distributions.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=71549139444&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_30

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_30

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:71549139444

SN - 3642046444

SN - 9783642046445

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 335

EP - 346

BT - Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings

T2 - 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009

Y2 - 18 October 2009 through 20 October 2009

ER -