Bayesian auctions with friends and foes

Po-An Chen*, David Kempe

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Conference contribution同行評審

4 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding strategies. A simple and natural model for bidders' utilities in these settings posits that the utility of a losing bidder i as a result of bidder j winning is a constant (positive or negative) fraction of bidder j's utility. We study such auctions under a Bayesian model in which all valuations are distributed independently according to a known distribution, but the actual valuations are private. We describe and analyze Nash Equilibrium bidding strategies in two broad classes: regular friendship networks with arbitrary valuation distributions, and arbitrary friendship networks with identical uniform valuation distributions.

原文English
主出版物標題Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings
頁面335-346
頁數12
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2009
事件2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009 - Paphos, Cyprus
持續時間: 18 10月 200920 10月 2009

出版系列

名字Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
5814 LNCS
ISSN(列印)0302-9743
ISSN(電子)1611-3349

Conference

Conference2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009
國家/地區Cyprus
城市Paphos
期間18/10/0920/10/09

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