Bank management expertise and asset securitization policies

Tsung Kang Chen*, Hsien Hsing Liao, Jing Syuan Ye

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

7 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

We explore how the expertise of a bank holding company's management team affects its asset securitization policies. We find management team members with an MBA degree and top management experience securitize more low risk loans while those with core functional executive positions securitize fewer high risk loans. In addition, internal liquidity, governance quality, and risk management quality moderate these effects. Moreover, risk management concerns are the main driver of the negative effect of the percentage of core functional executives on asset securitization. We also provide evidence that core functional executives deem securitized mortgage loans riskier after the subprime crisis.

原文English
文章編號105667
期刊Journal of Banking and Finance
109
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 12月 2019

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