Bank credit risk and structural credit models: Agency and information asymmetry perspectives

Hsien Hsing Liao*, Tsung-Kang Chen, Chia Wu Lu

*此作品的通信作者

研究成果: Article同行評審

59 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This work investigates the effects of agency and information asymmetry issues embedded in structural form credit models on bank credit risk evaluation, using American bank data from 2001 to 2005. Findings show that both the agency problem and information asymmetry significantly cause deviations in the credit risk evaluation of structural form models from agency ratings. Five independent factors explain a deviation of 42.6-78.3% and should be incorporated into future credit risk modeling. Additionally, both the effects of information asymmetry and debt-equity agency positively relate to the deviation while that of management-equity agency relates to it negatively.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)1520-1530
頁數11
期刊Journal of Banking and Finance
33
發行號8
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1 8月 2009

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