Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts

Chia Ying Chan, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin*


研究成果: Article同行評審

2 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)


This study investigates the association between CEO perquisites and bank loan spreads. We collect detailed data on CEO perquisites from the proxy statements of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 2015 to study this issue. The empirical evidence supports the agency cost view that the lending banks demand significantly higher returns (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with higher CEO perquisites. We further confirm that the effect of these perquisites remains after we control for various corporate governance and agency cost factors. We conclude that banks consider CEO perquisites as a type of agency cost when they make lending decisions.

頁(從 - 到)1221–1258
期刊Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
出版狀態Published - 5月 2021


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