Abstract
The paper considers the pricing and allocation issues of distributing digital contents via Web and P2P channels. Utilizing a game theoretic model, the allocation equilibrium with respect to various business goals is examined. We find that the P2P channel is always under-utilized in an organization, and present an incentive scheme to achieve an efficient channel configuration. Under a market structure with sequential moves, both channels set higher price and collect higher profit. Particularly, the second mover enjoys higher price and market share. A provider with integrated channels will charge a higher price on the Web channel and the Web channel becomes under-utilized.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 243-257 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Decision Support Systems |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2010 |
Keywords
- Competition and collaboration
- Content distribution
- IT investment
- Network pricing
- Peer-to-peer