TY - JOUR
T1 - Opinion Optimization for Two Different Social Objectives
T2 - Combinatorial Algorithms and Linear Program Rounding
AU - Chen, Po An
AU - Chen, Yi Le
AU - Lo, Wei
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Institute of Information Science. All rights reserved.
PY - 2024/3
Y1 - 2024/3
N2 - In this paper, we aim to optimize the two different social objectives of opinion optimization at equilibrium by controlling some individuals. This is usually called “Stackelberg games”, in which a centralized authority is allowed to assign the strategies to a subset of individuals. The Stackelberg strategies of the centralized authority are the algorithms to select a subset of individuals and decide the actions for them in order to palliate the cost caused by the selfish behavior of the uncontrolled individuals. We give some combinatoral algorithms and linear program rounding algorithms as Stackelberg strategies for approximately optimizing the objective of utilitarian social cost (on special cases) and the objective of total expressed opinion (on general directed graphs), respectively.
AB - In this paper, we aim to optimize the two different social objectives of opinion optimization at equilibrium by controlling some individuals. This is usually called “Stackelberg games”, in which a centralized authority is allowed to assign the strategies to a subset of individuals. The Stackelberg strategies of the centralized authority are the algorithms to select a subset of individuals and decide the actions for them in order to palliate the cost caused by the selfish behavior of the uncontrolled individuals. We give some combinatoral algorithms and linear program rounding algorithms as Stackelberg strategies for approximately optimizing the objective of utilitarian social cost (on special cases) and the objective of total expressed opinion (on general directed graphs), respectively.
KW - combinatorial algorithms
KW - linear program rounding
KW - opinion optimization
KW - randomized algorithms
KW - Stackelberg strategies
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85188173383&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.6688/JISE.202403_40(2).0001
DO - 10.6688/JISE.202403_40(2).0001
M3 - Editorial
AN - SCOPUS:85188173383
SN - 1016-2364
VL - 40
SP - 217
EP - 230
JO - Journal of Information Science and Engineering
JF - Journal of Information Science and Engineering
IS - 2
ER -