Multi-path vs. single-path replies to skepticism

Wen fang Wang*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


In order to reply to the contemporary skeptic’s argument for the conclusion that we don’t have any empirical knowledge about the external world, several authors have suggested different fallibilist theories of knowledge that reject the epistemic closure principle. Holliday [8], however, shows that almost all of them suffer from either the problem of containment or the problem of vacuous knowledge. Furthermore, Holliday [9] suggests that the fallibilist should allow a proposition to have multiple sets of relevant alternatives, each of which is sufficient while none is necessary, if all its members are eliminated, for knowing that proposition. Not completely satisfied with Holliday’s multi-path reply to the skeptic, the author suggests a new single-path relevant alternative theory of knowledge and argues that it can avoid both the problem of containment and the problem of vacuous knowledge while rejecting skepticism.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationBusiness Process Management - 15th International Conference, BPM 2017, Proceedings
EditorsJeremy Seligman, Tomoyuki Yamada, Alexandru Baltag
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages14
ISBN (Print)9783319649993
StatePublished - 2017
Event15th International Conference on Business Process Management, BPM 2017 - Barcelona, Spain
Duration: 10 Sep 201715 Sep 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10445 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference15th International Conference on Business Process Management, BPM 2017


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