Interlocked executives’ bad reputation in the labor market

Ning Tang, Jianqiang Chen, Chih Yung Lin*, Le Quoc Tuan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This study investigates whether executives who concurrently hold director positions in other firms undergoing reputation-damaging incidents, such as fraud, are more likely to face forced turnovers. Using logistic regression with a matched sample, we find an increased likelihood of CEOs being replaced when their director-position interlocked firms go through negative events. The labor market further penalizes such executives, as the probability is lower for them to keep their current positions and gain new board seats in the future. The results are stronger for firms with higher external governance.

Original languageEnglish
Article number104788
JournalFinance Research Letters
StatePublished - Jan 2024


  • Corporate networks
  • Fraud
  • Interlocking directorates
  • Managerial turnovers
  • Ownership


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