TY - JOUR
T1 - Health Care Competition and Antibiotic Use in Taiwan
AU - Bennett, Daniel
AU - Hung, Che Lun
AU - Lauderdale, Tsai Ling
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
PY - 2015/6/1
Y1 - 2015/6/1
N2 - Antibiotic resistance, a negative externality of antibiotic use, is a growing threat to public health. Health care competition may encourage antibiotic use because receiving an antibiotic is a form of 'quality' for many patients. This paper examines the effect of market concentration on antibiotic use in a large, nationally-representative data set from Taiwan. Moving from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile of market concentration is associated with 6.6 per cent greater antibiotic use. We control for leading market-level confounds, including population density and community health. We also show that the correlation is robust using fixed effects for patients, physicians and diagnoses. We document the correlation between antibiotic use and patient retention, which suggests a mechanism for this result. Finally, we show that strict regulation of antibiotics reduces but does not eliminate the effect of competition on antibiotic use.
AB - Antibiotic resistance, a negative externality of antibiotic use, is a growing threat to public health. Health care competition may encourage antibiotic use because receiving an antibiotic is a form of 'quality' for many patients. This paper examines the effect of market concentration on antibiotic use in a large, nationally-representative data set from Taiwan. Moving from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile of market concentration is associated with 6.6 per cent greater antibiotic use. We control for leading market-level confounds, including population density and community health. We also show that the correlation is robust using fixed effects for patients, physicians and diagnoses. We document the correlation between antibiotic use and patient retention, which suggests a mechanism for this result. Finally, we show that strict regulation of antibiotics reduces but does not eliminate the effect of competition on antibiotic use.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84930911775&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/joie.12075
DO - 10.1111/joie.12075
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84930911775
SN - 0022-1821
VL - 63
SP - 371
EP - 393
JO - Journal of Industrial Economics
JF - Journal of Industrial Economics
IS - 2
ER -