EQUILIBRIUM BALKING STRATEGIES IN UNOBSERVABLE QUEUES WITH MULTIPLE VACATIONS AND AN OPTIONAL SERVICE

This paper examines equilibrium mixed strategies in unobservable Markovian queues featuring a second optional service with server vacations, where arriving customers may choose to join or balk the system. All customers arriving at the system receive the essential service, and some customers opt for the second service after the first service has been completed. Once all customers in the system have been served, the server takes the first of multiple vacations. If no customers are waiting upon from the vacation, then the server takes another vacation. In unobservable queues, arriving customers cannot know the queue length; however, the information pertaining to the server state may be available. By examining unobservable queues (fully unobservable and almost unobservable cases), it is possible to formulate an equilibrium joining strategy as well as the socially optimal probability of joining a fully unobservable queue. This paper also presents numerical examples illustrating how system parameters affect mixed equilibrium and socially optimal balking strategies.