CEO overconfidence and financial crisis: Evidence from bank lending and leverage

Po Hsin Ho, Chia Wei Huang, Chih-Yung Lin*, Ju Fang Yen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

163 Scopus citations


Over a period that includes the 1998 Russian crisis and 2007-2009 financial crisis,. banks with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) were more likely to weaken lending standards and increase leverage than other banks. in advance of a crisis,. making them more vulnerable to the shock of the crisis.During crisis years, they generally experienced more increases in loan defaults, greater drops in operating and stock return performance, greater increases in expected default probability, and higher likelihood of CEO turnover or failure than other banks.CEO overconfidence thus can. explain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior among banks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)194-209
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2016


  • Bank lending
  • Bank leverage
  • CEO overconfidence
  • Financial crisis
  • Risk culture


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