論Pritchard對極端懷疑論悖論的解決方案

Wen-Fang Wang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

D. Pritchard (2016) analyzes two modern radical skeptical arguments (or what he calls 'radical skeptical paradoxes') and their presuppositions and argues that there is no uniformed undercutting solution to both of them. One of the two arguments appeals to a diachronic version of the epistemic closure principle (ECP), while the other appeals to a version of what he calls 'the underdetermination principle' (UP). In order to solve these skeptical paradoxes simultaneously, Pritchard appeals to two different philosophical ideas: Wittgenstein's idea about hinge commitments and McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism. This paper concentrates on the skeptical paradox that appeals to the diachronic ECP and Pritchard's solution to it, though it will also indicate their relationship to the one that appeals to UP when needed. The author argues several things in this paper. First, he argues that Pritchard's solution, one that appeals to Wittgenstein's idea of hinge commitments, to the skeptical paradox is not satisfactory for several reasons. Second, he argues that, were the solution workable, it could actually form a uniformed solution to both skeptical paradoxes. Finally, he argues that there is a serious problem in Pritchard's description of the skeptical paradox that appeals to the diachronic version of ECP: a proper part of the paradox has already contained some unacceptable result to the skeptic, so that, strictly speaking, there is no genuine paradox at all or, at least, the skeptic should not use the diachronic version of ECP to argue that we lack empirical knowledge about the external world.
Original languageChinese (Traditional)
Pages (from-to)35-60
Number of pages26
Journal哲學與文化
Volume46
Issue number5
StatePublished - 1 May 2019

Keywords

  • Skepticism
  • The Epistemic Closure Principle
  • The Underdetermination Principle
  • Hinge Commitments
  • Epistemological Disjunctivism
  • Undercutting Solution

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