投資和平？外資互賴與鼓勵外資政策對國家間衝突影響之分析（1985～2001）

Since the 1970s, a rapid surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) has become one of the most important factors shaping the landscape of the global political economy. While theorists of commercial liberalism place emphasis on trade and claim the pacifying effects of economic interdependence on interstate conflict, few recognize plausible linkages between FDI and interstate conflict. This goal of this paper is to investigate the influence of FDI on interstate conflict. Differing from the conventional wisdom that merely focuses on the impact of opportunity costs on conflict, it argues that states' pro-FDI policies may reveal their reluctance to initiate military action in interstate disputes. Moreover, this paper also contends that symmetrical FDI interdependence may be a promising factor facilitating peace. Nevertheless, the pacifying effects of the preceding FDI factors may vary in different dyads of state combination between developed and developing countries, due to the structural pattern of FDI flows. This paper analyzes the FDI-conflict relationship from 1985 to 2001. The findings suggest that the institutional feature of property rights protection in a dyad of states is likely to be a credible indicator promoting the prospect of peace between states.